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C:razy Reasons 
STEPHEN J. MORSE* 
If a businessperson makes a bad deal because she is inattentive to 
crucial i nformation, the contract wil l  be enforced; if she is inattentive 
because she is crazy, she may be able to avoid the contract. An ex-con 
with three priors for aggravated assault who threatens to do it again 
cannot be incarcerated unless she gets close enough to completion to 
qualify for criminal attempt l iabil ity; if she threatens to commit the same 
crime because she is crazy, she may be involuntarily  civilly committed. 
Why does the law provide for such differential treatment? 
Thi s  article pursues and updates arguments I made two decades ago 
about why the law treats some people with mental disorder special ly and 
how such laws should be formulated and adjudicated.1 Although I still 
reach most of the same conclusions, the nature of the argument h as 
changed. The Article begins by addressing the law ' s  view of the person 
and then turns to the theory of responsibility that flows from that view. 
The account will be positive and internal . That is ,  it accepts the general 
val idity of the current legal regime and tries to offer the best explanation 
of it. Next, it considers the general criteria for responsibility and excuse. 
I suggest that the general capacity to grasp and be guided by reason and 
l ack of coercion are the criteria for responsibil ity that both morality and 
the law adopt. Correlatively, the lack of such general capacity for reason 
and being confronted with a sufficiently coercive hard choice are the 
genuine excusing conditions. This section concludes by suggesting that 
many of the usual explanations  for nonresponsibil ity or excuse are 
* Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology 
and Law in Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania. This paper was first presented at a 
conference on mental disability law sponsored by the University of San Diego School of 
Law. I should like to thank the conference organizer, Grant Morris, the other conference 
pa1ticipants, Larry Alexander, and John Monahan for helpful comments. 
I. S tephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of 
Menra! Hea!rh Law, 51 S .  CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978). 
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wrong, misleading, or confused. In part icular, it explains why causation, 
i ncluding abnormal biological causes, do not per se imply incompetence 
or nonresponsibi l i ty .  
The art icle then turns to the relation of  mental abnormality to the 
theory of responsibil ity and to why the l aw treats some crazy people  
different ly from mentally normal citi zens. The thesis is  that al l  the 
var ious l egal criteria for incompetence, nonresponsib i l ity and the l ike are 
simply ways of asking whether the agent acted for crazy reasons and 
consequently was generally incapable of being guided by good reason in 
the operat ive context. The argument is both positive and normative :  i t  
explains current mental health l aws and practice and it furnishes a 
framework for both celebration and criticism . Finally, the Article 
considers what data legal decision makers need to adjudicate mental 
health law cases and what role  mental health professionals should play 
in provi ding such data. 
I .  THE LAW'S VIEW OF THE PERSON AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Intentional human conduct, that is, action, unlike other phenomena, 
can be explained by physical causes and by reasons for action. 
Although physical causes explain the movements of galax ies and 
planets, molecules, infrahuman species, and all the other moving parts of 
the physical universe, only human action can also be explained by 
reasons. I t  makes no sense to ask a bull that gores a matador, "Why did 
you do that?," but this question makes sense and is vitally important 
when it is addressed to a person who sticks a knife into the chest of 
another human being. It makes a great difference to us if the knife­
wielder is a surgeon who is cutting with the patient' s  consent or a person 
who is enraged at the victim and intends to kil l  him. 
When one asks about human action, "Why did she do that?", two 
distinct types of answers may therefore be given. The reason-giving 
explanation accounts for human behavior as a product of intentions that 
arise from the desires and beliefs of the agent. The second type of 
explanation treats human behavior as simply one more bit of the 
phenomena of the universe, subj ect to the same natural, physical l aws 
that explain all phenomena. Suppose, for example ,  we wish to explain 
why Molly became a mental health lawyer and advocate for consumers' 
rights. The reason-giving explanation might be that she wishes to 
emulate her admired mother, a committed attorney and advocate, and 
Molly believes that the best way to do so is also to become a lawyer. If 
we want to account for why Molly chose one law school rather than 
another, a perfectly satisfactory explanation under the circumstances 
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would be that Molly knew that the chosen school was the best that 
admi tted her and hac! a strong mental health l aw cun-iculum.  
Ph ilosophers refer to this mode of reason-giving explanation as "folk 
psychology."  
The mechanistic type of explanation would approach these questions 
quite differently .  For example, those who believe that the mind can 
u l timately be reduced to the biophysical workings of the brain and 
nervous system-eliminative materialists-also believe that Molly's 
"decision" is solely the law-governed product of biophysical causes. 
Her desires, beliefs, intentions, and choices are therefore simply 
epiphenomenal , rather than genuine causes of her behavior. According 
to this mode of explanation, Molly 's  "choices" to go to law school and 
to become an attorney and all other human behavior are 
indistinguishable from any other phenomena in the universe, including 
the movements of molecules and bacteria. 
The social sciences, including psychology and psychiatry, are 
uncomfortably wedged between the reason-giving and the mechanistic 
accounts of human behavior. Sometimes they treat behavior 
"objectively," treating it as primarily mechanistic or physical; other 
times, social science treats behavior "subjectively," as a text to be 
interpreted. Yet other times, social science engages in an uneasy 
amalgam of the two. What is always clear, however, is that the domain 
of the social sciences is human action and not simply the movements of 
bodies in space. One can attempt to assimilate folk psychology's  
reason-giving to mechanistic explanation by  claiming that desires, 
beliefs and intentions are genuine causes, and not simply rationalizations 
of behavior. Indeed, folk psychology proceeds on the assumption that 
reasons for action are genuinely causal. But the assimilationist position 
is philosophically controversial, a controversy that will not be solved 
until the mind-body problem is "solved"-an event unlikely to occur in 
the foreseeable future. 
Law, unlike mechanistic explanation or the conflicted stance of the 
social sciences, views human action as almost entirely reason-governed. 
Law conceives of the person as a practical reasoning, rule-following 
being, most of whose legally relevant movements must be understood in 
terms of beliefs, desires, and intentions. As a system of rules to guide 
and govern human interaction-the legislatures and courts do not decide 
what rules infrahuman species must follow-the law presupposes that 
people use legal rules as premises in the practical syllogisms that guide 
much human action. No "instinct" governs how fast a person drives on 
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the open highway. But among the various explanatory variables, the 
posted speed l imit and the belief in the probabi l i ty of paying the 
consequences for exceeding it surely play a large role i n  the driver's 
choice of speed. For the law, then, a person is a practical reasoner. The 
legal view of the person is not that a ll  people always reason and behave 
consistent ly rationally accordi ng to some pre-ordained, normative notion 
of rational ity . It is simply that people are creatures who act for and 
consistently with their reasons for action and who are generally capable 
of minimal rationality accordi ng to mostly  conventional, socially 
constructed standards. 
The law's concept of responsibi l ity follows log ical ly from its 
conception of the person and the nature of law itself. As a system of 
rules that guides and governs human interaction, l aw tells  citizens what 
they may and may not do, what they must or must not do, what abi lities 
are required competently to perform certain tasks, and what 
consequences wi l l  fol low from their conduct. Unless human beings 
were rational creatures who could understand the good reasons for 
action, including the relevant facts and rules, and could  conform to legal 
requirements through intentional action, the law would be powerless to 
affect human action. Legally responsible agents are therefore people 
who have the general capacity to grasp and be guided by good reason in  
particular legal contexts. For example, they must be  generall y  capable 
of properly  using the rules as premises in practical reasoning. Legally 
responsible agents are capable of rational  practical reasoning and the 
l aw's  usual presumptions are that adults are so capable and that the same 
rules may be applied to all .  
The general capacity for rationality is not self-defining .  It must be 
understood according to some contingent, normative notion both of 
rationality and of how much capability is required. For example, legal 
responsibility might require the capability of understanding the reason 
for an applicable rule, as well as the rule's narrow behavior command .  
These are matters of  moral, political and, ultimately, legal judgment, 
about which reasonable  people can and do differ .  I offer in the next 
section2 an interpretation of the law's rationality requirement, but there 
is no uncontroversial definition of rationality or of what kind and how 
much is required for responsibility in various legal contexts. These are 
normative issues and, whatever the outcome might be within a polity 
and its legal system, the debate is about human action-intentional 
behavior guided by reasons. 
192 
2. See infra Section IIA. 
[Vol. 10: 1 89. 1 999] Croz.y Reasons 
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEG.'\L ISSUES 
II. THE CRITERIA FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND EXCUSE 
Mental health laws treat some crazy people  special l y  and al l such laws 
inc lude two elements . First, the potenti al subject must engage in actual 
or potent ia l  legal l y  relevant behavior, such as incompetent performance 
of some task or dangerous conduct. An agent who is simply crazy but 
who does not otherwise engage in behavior that concerns the l aw wi l l  
not be the subject of special mental health l aw treatment. Second, the 
l egal ly  rel evant behavior must be the result of mental di sorder. For 
example, a criminal defendant' s  irrationality must be symptomatic of 
d i sorder. The potential c iv i l  committee's potential reason for dangerous 
behavior must be crazy. The second requirement is crucial because it i s  
the doctrinal expression of the nonresponsibil ity assumption that perm its 
some crazy peopl e  to be treated specia l ly .  In other words , special legal 
treatment is warranted if a crazy person was or is  not responsible for 
legall y  relevant conduct. In such cases , the usual presumptions in favor 
of l iberty and autonomy are suspended because responsible agency 
based on the capacity for rationality is  the premise for these 
presumptions .  To support this c laim requires that we have in place a 
robust, general theory of normative competence and nonresponsibi lity . I 
argue that the l aw and morality include two generic nonresponsibility 
conditions: nonresponsible irrationality (or normative incompetence) 
and nonresponsible hard choice . An agent who is nonresponsibly 
irrational or faces a sufficiently hard choice when she acts or will act is 
not responsible for the conduct motivated by irrationality or coercive 
hard choices. This section first discusses these two excusing conditions 
and then turns to exploration of common false, misleading, and 
confusing explanations for excuse. 
A. Rationality 
The general capacity for rationality or normative competence is the 
most general, important prerequisite to being a responsible agent.3 
3. I state this criterion in alternative terms-rationality or nonnative 
competence-because the concept of rationality is associated with so much historical , 
conceptual and philosophical disagreement that the term distracts many people. As I 
explain infra, pp. 199-202. I mean nothing exalted or essential by the term. It is simply 
a common sense term used to cover a congeries of human capacities without which 
morality and human flourishing in general would be difficult. If the term seems too 
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Indeed, the lack of this  general capacity explains virtual ly all cases in 
which moral ity and the lavv fully or partially excuse conduct, and it 
explains in general the law's special treatment of certain classes of 
people, such as children and some crazy people. More specifically. for 
morality and the law, rationality or normative competence means that 
the agent has the general capacity to understand and to be guided by the 
good reasons that appl y in the relevant legal or moral context. The agent 
can be incapable of rational ity, cannot be guided by good reason, in 
three different respects: first, the agent is unable rationally to 
comprehend the relevant facts; second, the agent is unable rational ly to 
comprehend the applicable moral or legal rules or expectations; and 
third, the agent is unable rationally to assess the import of the facts or 
rules. Although distinguishable, all three could be col lapsed into the 
general notion that the agent is unable rational ly  to understand what she 
was doing when she acted .4 
Let us consider some examples. If a businessperson makes an 
extravagantly bad deal, she must suffer the consequences because the 
law assumes that adults are capable of understanding the nature of the 
deal , even though on the present occasion the feckless contractor might 
have been scandalously careless about her own best interest. But if the 
reason that the businessperson was unaware of the nature of the deal was 
that the agent was incapable of rational understanding, then the agent 
will be allowed to avoid the deal .  The virtues and consequences of a 
regime of free contracting would be undermined if agents incapable of 
rationality were held to their bargains. 
For another example, just criminal blame and punishment require that 
those who violate the criminal law must be capable of rationally 
understanding their harmfu l  conduct and its consequences. Effective 
criminal law requires that citizens must understand in general terms what 
conduct is prohibited, the nature of their conduct, and the consequences 
for doing what the law prohibits .  Homicide laws, for example, require 
that citizens understand that intentionally killing other h uman beings is 
prohibited in most circumstances, what counts as killing conduct, and 
that the state will inflict pain if the rule is violated. A person incapable 
of understanding the rule or the nature of her own conduct, including the 
context in which it is embedded, could not properly use the rule to guide 
her conduct .  
To take a specific example, a person who delusionally believed that 
broad, I am perlectly comfortable with the tenn, "normative competence." 
4.  The M'Naghten test for legal i nsanity distinguishes the first two .  M'Naghten's 
Case, 10 Clark & Finnely, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The first prong of the Model Penal 
Code test collapses the first two rationality defects. 
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she was about to be ki l led by another person and kills the other in the 
mistaken bel ief that she must do so to save her own l ife, does not 
rationally understand what she is doing . She of course knows that she is 
kil ling a human being and does so intentional l y .  And, al though in the 
abstract she probabl y  knows and endorses the moral and legal 
prohibition against unjustified kil l ing, in this case the rule against 
unjustifiable homicide will be ineffective because she is incapable of 
rationally understanding that her action is not justifiable. It would be 
unfair to blame and punish the delusional agent because she is not a 
morally responsible agent. She is unable rationally to comprehend the 
most moral l y  relevant fact bearing on her culpabil ity-whether her l ife 
is genuinely threatened. 
The general incapacity for rationality is what distinguishes the 
mentally disordered agent from people who are ignorant, mistaken, 
careless or the like, but who have the general ability rationally to 
understand and to satisfy social, moral, and legal rules and expectations. 
If people with this capacity fail because they behave irrationally , we 
believe they are responsible for their failure because they were capable 
of succeeding. In contrast, we believe that the disordered agent' s  
inationality i s  not her fault because she lacked the general capacity for 
rationality . The delusional person is faultless for failing to recognize 
that her life is not imperilled; the careless person who makes the same, 
unreasonable mistake about the impending threat of deadly harm is at 
fault .  
I have claimed that the general capacity for rationality is the primary 
criterion of responsibility and that its lack is the primary excusing 
condition. A general capacity is nothing more than an underlying ability 
to engage in certain behavior.5 English speakers, for example, have the 
general capacity to speak English, even when they are silent or are 
speaking a different l anguage. Of course, the general capacity can refer 
to behavior that may be a continuum. For example ,  a person of average 
strength might be able easily to lift a certain amount of weight. As the 
weight increased, it would become harder for the person and would 
finally become impossible .  As long as the agent is generally  capable of 
certain conduct, it is fair to hold the agent responsible for failing to 
engage in such conduct if there is reason for the agent to do so. For 
example, suppose an object fell on and pinned down a victim that the 
5.  For more detail ,  see R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL 
SENTIMENTS 214-21 ( 1 994). 
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agent had a duty to aid. I f  the object were l ight the average agent might 
have no difficulty removing it; if i t  were heavy , remov i ng it would be 
more difficul t, but moral ity and the l aw alike would expect the agent to 
strain to do so and wou ld  b lame an agent who did not exercise a capacity 
she possessed.  Peopl e  often engage in legal ly  relevant behavior for non­
rational ,  inational, and foolish reasons, but this does not excuse them or 
render them nonresponsible if they are genera l ly  capable of rational ity .  
There are objections to  the notion of  a general capacity. Some might 
contend that i t  is impossible for an agent to exercise a general capacity 
on a specific occasion when the agent did not exercise i t .  Such an 
argument is simply a form of the reductio that no one is capable of doing 
anything other than what they did do. This is trivial l y  true in the sense 
that agents cannot do "p" and "not-p" at the same t ime.  It does not 
fol low, however, that it is impossible for an agent to exercise the general 
capacity . An Engl ish speaker who is silent surely has the general 
capacity to speak English .  A more chall enging version of the same 
c laim is the argument from determinism, which woul d  suggest that the 
notion of a general capacity is useless because at a fixed time only one 
outcome is ever possible for both people and the other moving parts of 
the universe, given antecedent events and the fixed laws of the physical 
world. Such an argument is an external, metaphysical attack on the 
basic concepts and practices of responsibility . Taken seriously,  it would 
suggest that no one should ever be treated as more or l ess responsible 
than anyone else because no one or everyone is responsible. Thus, this 
argument cannot possibly explain or furnish internal grounds for 
criticism of cunent concepts and practices.6 The notion of a general 
capacity is one we use all the time to evaluate the behavior of ourselves 
and others and there is no reason to abandon i t  in  the face of an 
unresolvable metaphysical challenge. 
Rationality is of course a continuum concept and individuals differ 
wide ly  in their ability to get the facts straight, to understand the rules, to 
reason, and the like. People with fewer endowments will  find i t  harder 
to be rational; people with more will find it easier. In general , however, 
the threshold for responsibility or competence in law is not high.  Quite 
minimal rationality will  usually  suffice and unimpaired adults will have 
the general capacity i n  most contexts to meet the law's relatively modest 
requirements. 
What is the content of rationality that responsibility requires? As part 
of the normative,  socially constructed practice of ascribing 
responsibility, there cannot be an a priori , uncontroversial answer. A 
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normative, moral and political ju dgment concerning the content and 
degree of rationality is necessary. Nonetheless, some guidance is 
possible. I do not have an exalted or complicated notion of rationality, 
which is in fact a congeries of skills, rather than a unitary capacity. At 
the very least, it must include the ability, in Susan Wolfs words, ·'to be 
sensitive and responsive to relevant changes in one's situation and 
environment-that is, to be tlexible."7 On this account rationality is the 
ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, and to reason 
instrumentally, including weighing the facts appropriately and according 
to a minimally  coherent preference-ordering. Rationality includes the 
general ability to recognize and be responsive to the good reasons that 
should guide action.8 Put yet another way, it is the ability to act for good 
reasons and it is always a good reason not to act (or to act) if doing so 
(or not doing so) will be harmful or maladaptive. Notice that it is not 
necessary for full responsibility that an agent acts for good, 
generalizable reason at the operative time. The general normative 
capacity to be able to grasp and be guided by reason is sufficient. 
After much thought, I have come to the conclusion that normative 
competence for criminal responsibility should require the ability to 
empathize and to feel guilt or some other reflexive reactive emotion. 
Unless an agent is able to put herself affectively in another's shoes, to 
have a sense of what a potential victim will feel as a result of the agent's 
conduct, and is able at least to feel the anticipation of unpleasant guilt 
for breach, that agent will lack the capacity to grasp and be guided by 
the primary rational reasons for complying with moral expectations. 
What could be a better reason not to breach a moral expectation than a 
full, emotional understanding of the harm one will cause another? 
People who lack such understanding are, in my opinion, "morally 
irrational" and it is moral responsibility that is in issue. 
A highly controversial question is whether desires or preferences in 
themselves can be irrationa1.9 It is of course true that having desires 
most people consider irrational is likely to get someone into trouble, 
especially if the desires and situations that tempt an agent are strong. 
Nonetheless, I conclude that even if desires can be construed as 
irrational, inational desires do not deprive the agent of normative 
7 .  SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 6 9  ( 1 990). 
8. See JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RA VIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: 
A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBIL ITY 4 1  (1998). 
9. ROBERT NOZICK. THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 1 39-40 ( 1993) (''At present, 
we have no adequate theory of the substantive rationality of goals and desires .... " ) . 
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competence unless they somehow disable the rational capac1t1es just 
addressed or they produce an internal hard choice situation 
distinguishable from the choices experienced by people with equally 
strong, rational desires. In other words, if the agent with inational 
desires can comprehend the relevant features of her conduct, she can be 
held responsible if her irrational desires are the reasons she engages in 
legally relevant behavior. 
Because 1 claim that irrationality or normative incompetence best 
explains why we excuse and is the primary excusing condition, the 
concept of irrationality must do a great deal of work i n  the account 
presented. One might therefore desire a more precise, uncontroversia! 
definition of inationality, but such a desire would be unreasonable. The 
definition I am using, which is always open to normative revision, is 
grounded in our ordinary, everyday understanding of practical reasoning 
and its critical role in human interaction, including morality. We are, 
after all, the only creatures on earth-and I don't "do" elsewhere-who 
truly act for reasons. We all everywhere and always successfully 
employ the imprecise definition I am using to evaluate the moral and 
nonmoral conduct of ourselves and others. To require more is to require 
the impossible and the unnecessary. Moreover, if one wishes to abandon 
irrationality as the core excusing condition, the burden is then on the 
agent rejecting inationality to offer and justify a more morally 
compelling and precise alternative. As we shall see in S ection II. C., 10 
most of the alternatives offered do not and cannot explain the excuses 
we have and would be unworkable. 
B. "Hard Choice" 
In addition to inationality, a wrongfully-imposed hard choice is also 
an excusing or nonresponsibility condition. Some would term the 
condition, "compulsion," but the true basis of excuse is hard choice. In 
brief, the law excuses if an agent is coerced to engage in legally relevant 
conduct. For example, the criminal law's doctrine of duress excuses a 
criminal wrongdoer if the agent is threatened with death or grievous 
bodily harm against the defendant or another and a person of reasonable 
firmness would have been "unable to resist."11 Similarly ,  a n  agent 
coerced to contract will be able to avoid that contract. In other words, an 
agent faced with a particularly "hard choice"-say, commit a crime or 
be killed or grievously injured-is excused if the choice was too hard to 
!0. See inji-a p. 203-09. 
II. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.09 (1985). 
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require the agent to resist.12 We think thar it is unfair to hold the agent 
responsible for her legally relevant conduct because resisting the 
coercion was too hard under the circumstances. 
Coercion is not based on empirical assumptions about the specific 
capacities of individual agents to resist coercive conditions. It is a 
normative, moralized standard. The best interpretation of objective 
standards for coercion, such as the "person of reasonable firmness," is 
that they ask when a choice was too hard to require the agent to resist or 
face negative legal consequences for yielding. If, objectively, a person 
of reasonable firmness or the equivalent would resist, the choice is not 
too hard and the agent will be held responsible for the conduct in 
question. 
The "person of reasonable firmness" standard does not mean that 
everyone who is not dispositionally of reasonable firmness will be 
excused. The defense is not available to a defendant allegedly "unable" 
to resist if a person of reasonable firmness would have been able to 
resist. Those who are fortunate enough to be especially brave and those 
who are of average braveness will be able to meet it quite readily. Those 
who are of less than average dispositional finnness will have more 
!2. See id. The law requires that the threat be made by a human being, but why 
should it matter if the threat is made by another person or arises as a result of naturally 
occurring, impersonal circumstances') Imagine the following scenarios, which I bon·ow 
from a leading criminal law casebook. In the first, a driver is negotiating a steep, narrow 
mountain road, with great precipices on both sides. A gunslinger is holding a gun to the 
driver's head, urging her on. As they come around the curve, two people loom ahead, 
lying unconscious in the middle of the road. There is no way to go around them. The 
gunsli nger orders the driver at pain of death to drive over the people, which wi l l  surely 
kil l  them. If the driver accedes, she has the possibil ity of succeeding with the hard 
choice excuse of duress in jurisdictions that allow the excuse in cases involving the 
taking of innocent l ife. Now consider the same scenario, except that there is no 
gunslinger. Instead, the driver's brakes fail, despite her completely conscientious 
maintenance of the vehicle. Either she must drive over the people, surely kil l ing them, 
or to avoid them, she must go over the side of the precipice and fall to a certain death 
herself. If an excuse is possible in the first case, it ought to be available in the second. 
Moreover, why should a threat of death or grievous bodily  harm be necessary, as the l aw 
now requires? People of reasonable firmness are more l ikely to find such threats too hard 
to bear, compared to threats of lesser physical or psychological harms, but why exclude 
the latter a priori? Consider a person who possesses a financially worthless object-say, 
a cheap memento from a beloved, deceased parent-that is of supreme psychological 
importance to the person. Now, a desperado threatens to destroy the memento unless the 
agent destroys more valuable property or infl icts some form of physical harm on another. 
It is at least morally thinkable that, depending on the degree of the other harm, a rational 
person of reasonable firmness might yield. 
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trouble resisting when they should. Still, if we judge that the person had 
the general capacity to comply with the reasonable firmness standard, 
then she will be held responsible for yielding when she should not, even 
if it is harder for her to resist than for most. Similarly, if the conditions 
under which an agent contracted were objectively non-coercive, the 
agent will be held to the bargain, even if she subjectively felt entirely 
coerced and contracted only because she felt this way. 
Objective legal standards always impose differential costs on agents, 
depending on the agents' endowments. People with less than average 
ability to meet them are still held to these standards if they are generally 
capable of meeting them. This legal result comports with common sense 
and ordinary morality. When important expectations are involved-for 
example, be careful; keep your promises: don't harm others-we believe 
it is fair to expect fellow citizens capable of meeting reasonable 
standards to comply .13 
Although in clear cases a coercion excuse seems morally and legally 
unproblematic, why a hard choice excuses or renders an agent 
nonresponsible is open to various interpretations. Assuming that 
coercion should excuse an agent from responsibility, two theories for 
why it excuses are possible. The first is that the agent is somehow 
incapacitated or disabled by the coercive circumstances. The second is 
that the agent's opportunity to act has been unfairly constrained, that is, 
the agent is a wronged victim. I believe that the latter is the most 
convincing account, 14 and as I argue below, the former tends to collapse 
into an irrationality claim.15 The coerced agent acts intentionally and 
entirely understandably to save herself from the coercive threat. Her 
will, understood as a functional executory state, operates effectively to 
translate her desire to avoid the feared harm into the action necessary to 
achieve this end.16 There is no "volitional" problem. If the threatening 
circumstances so overwhelm the agent or produce such anxiety that the 
1 3 .  See H.L .A . HART, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 37, 152-54 
( 1 968) .  
1 4. I here ally myself with v arious leading duress theorists. See, e.g., Joshua 
Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its 
Proper Limits, 62 S.  CAL. L. REV. 1 3 3 1  ( 1 989); Herbert Fingarette, Victimization: A 
Legalist Analysis of Coercion, Deception, Undue Influence, and Excusable Prison 
Escape, 42 WAS!·!. & LEE L. REV. 65 ( 1 985) .  
15. See infra pp. 203-05, 2 1 5- 1 7 . 
1 6. See HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANNE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 6 1  ( 1 979). See also infra section II. C, for a di scussion of the 
concept of the will or volition. See generally MICHAEL S .  MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 1 1 3 -65 ( 1 993)  
(presenting a complete theory of  volition and criticizing alternative accounts). 
200 
[Vo l .  I ll 1 89 .  1 999] Crazy Reasons 
THE JOURNr\L Of' CONTErvt PORr\RY LEGAL ISSUES 
agent cannot be guided by reason, then irrationality will e xcuse and there 
i s  no need for an independent coercion excuse. Indeed, if the defendant 
i s  subjecti vely cool and fearless but the circumstances are s u ffi c i e ntly 
obj ect ively coercive, she wil l  nonetheless be excused if  she yields .  
Coercion e xc uses the agent, I claim, because in sufficiently threatening 
circumstances i t  is simply unfair to require the agent to resist.  The 
wrongful ly-im posed choice is too hard to just ify holding an agent 
respons ib le  if she yields. 
Agents who appear to be incapable of reasonable firmness present an 
apparently problematic case for the hard choice nonresponsib i lity 
condition. Either moralized interpretation of coercion appears to risk 
u n fairness in some cases in which yielding is not excused because a 
person of reasonabl e  firmness would have resisted. Suppose a person 
appears genuinely unable to resist under such conditions or at least  finds 
it supremely  hard to resist. Consider a coward who is threatened with a 
hard punch unless she kills someone. Or consider a person with a 
morbid fear of being touched by another who is threatened with a light 
touch. Although virtually everyone, including cowardly types, would 
choose to be the victim of a punch or a touch rather than to kill, some 
people might find the threat of a punch or even a light touch as terrifying 
and coercive as a death threat. Assuming that some agents genuinely do 
find it supremely hard to resist lesser threats ,  how should morality and 
the law respond in such cases? 
On a non-consequential, desert-based theory of justice, holding people 
responsible under such circumstances would appear to be unjust because 
a person does not deserve to be held accountable for conduct that is 
impossible or unduly difficult to avoid. A purely consequential view 
might justify responsibility to encourage resistance among the marginal 
people who are capable of resisting, but only at the cost of injustice to 
those who find it sufficiently difficult to resist. 
How should cases of "subjective" hard choice be analyzed? Justice 
seems to demand nonresponsibility in such cases, but on what theory? 
One possible answer is that the person's general capacity for rationality 
is disabled. For example, the fear of bodily injury may be so morbid 
that any threat creates anxiety sufficient to block the person ' s  capacity to 
grasp and be guided by good reason. In such cases, standard irrationality 
claims will be sufficient and there will be no need to employ an 
independent coercion or hard choice claim. 
An alternative way of analyzing the "subj ective" hard choice case that 
perhaps has special relevance to mental health law is as an example of 
20 1 
what I term ' · internal h ard choice . "  In such cases,  the coercive 
c i rcumstance that creates the hard choice i s  not  an external , obj ectively 
threatening c ircumstance;  instead i t  i s  the threat of such supremely 
dysphoric inner states-psychological pain-that renders the choice so 
hard for this agent . 1 7  A model of hard choice created b y  the threat of 
in ternal dysphoria may be the best expl anation of why we bel ieve agents 
are not responsible in an array of cases that are often thought to require a 
"volitional " or control excuse, such as the pedophile, pyromaniac, 
compulsive gambler, drug "addict," and s imilar cases.  In al l ,  the 
predi sposition causes intense desires, the frustration of which threatens 
the agent with great dysphoria. Perhaps a person of reasonable firmness 
faced with sufficient dysphoria would yield. If so, perhaps the coward 
or other "subj ective" cases should not be held respon s ible i n  the absence 
of irrational i ty because they satisfy a properly expansive bard choice 
nonresponsibi l i ty condition. 
Although the internal h ard choice model i s  plausible and competing 
explan ations that rel y  on so-called volition al problems are confused or 
l ack empirical support, 1 8  I prefer to analyze these c ases i n  terms of 
irrational ity.  First, at  the most practical level ,  i t  will  often be too 
difficult  to assess the degree of threatened dysphoria that creates the 
hard choice. 19 Second, it  is simply not clear that the fear of dysphoria 
would ever produce a choice sufficiently hard to excuse an agent from 
the legal consequences of her action, except i n  precisely those cases i n  
which w e  would assume naturally that the agent' s ration al capacity w as 
essentially disabled. Death and grievous bodil y  h arm are dreadful 
consequences for virtuall y  any rational person. Other threatened 
consequences, such as lesser physical, emotional or economic harms, 
may al so be extremely unpleasant and subj ectively feared, but threat of 
such lesser harms will not warrant a hard choice excuse. For example,  
committing crimes i s  itself considered so wrong that we require people 
to buck u p  and obey the l aw ,  even if they are very fearful .  
Dysphoric mental or emotional states are surely  undesirable,  but does 
their threat produce a sufficiently hard choice to warrant 
n onresponsibi l i ty? I do not know the answer to this question, but 
perhaps at the extreme they do. People sufferin g  from severe depressive 
disorders, for example,  report subjective pain that is  as great and 
enduring as many forms of grievous bodily h arm, and sometimes they 
ki l l  themselves to avoid the psychological pain .  But people don' t  
1 7 .  I have explored such a model for inner coercion a t  length elsewhere. See 
Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 1 42 U. PA. L.  REv. 1 587, 1 619-34 ( 1994). 
1 8. See id. at 1658-59. 
1 9. See inji·a Section IV. B .  
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consciously engage in legally relevant behavior to ward off the feared 
onslaught of severe depression. And people suffering from such severe 
depression are undeniably i rrational . Simply put, i t  seems unl ikely that 
most rational agents threatened with dysphoria face a sufficiently hard 
choice to warrant nonresponsibility. 
Consider for comparison the feared dysphoria of addicts: Is i t  as 
severe as the fear of major depression'7 Again, I don' t  know the answer, 
but the physical symptoms of withdrawal from most drugs, for example. 
are simply not terribly severe-withdrawal from heroin is often l i kened 
to a bad tlu-and withdrawal can be medically managed to reduce the 
discomfort.2° Consequently ,  fear of the physical symptoms hardly seems 
to rise to the category of fear of death or grievous bodily harm, and 
medical management is a reasonable alternative to crime for some 
compul sions. I suspect that the feared dysphoria of unconsummated 
compulsive cravings is not as severe as the fear of death or grievous 
bodily harm. If I am correct, few sufferers from internal coercion wou ld 
succeed with a hard choice excuse, albeit we might feel sympathetic 
towards their pl ight. In sum, I am claiming that the person who appears 
genuinely incapable of resisting when the threats are objectively 
insufficient to excuse-if any there be-will almost certainly be a 
person with irrational fears or other irrational beliefs that wil l  satisfy the 
irrationality criteria for nonresponsibility . 
C .  False, Confusing and Misleading Explanations: Causation, Biology, 
Will, Choice, and Control 
People  consistently try to explain why some people are not 
responsible by claiming that nomesponsible agents are subject to 
determinism, or that their behavior is caused, especially by "abnormal" 
psychological or biological causes, or that they lack free will ,  or that 
they do not choose their behavior, or that they cannot control 
themselves. In contrast, I argue that most of these explanations are 
conclusory, false, beg the question, prove too much, or mislead. I have 
20. See JOHN KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 35-36 
( 1 983) .  Withdrawal from severe alcohol dependence can be an exception, but because 
ethanol is freely and inexpensively available for adults, those who fear withdrawal 
seldom need to commit crimes or engage in other untoward intentional behavior to 
obtain ethanol to avoid wi thdrawal. 
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given a fu l le r  account e l se where , 2 1 so I sha l l genera l l y  s u mmarize the 
argument here. B ecause neuroscient ifi c  understa n d i n g  of behavior 
i ncreases rapi dl y  and the relat ion berween abnormal biological causes 
and respon s i b i l i ty is consi dered p art i c u l arly re levan t  to menta l  health 
law, I g i ve an espec i a l l y  ful l  account  of this rel at ion .  
Determinism or u ni versal causat ion cannot be an excusing or 
nonresponsib i l i ty  co ndi t i on . [f  either is  a true description of causation, it 
app l ies to all events in the universe. If e i ther were an excusing 
condition, al l  behavior would be excused and n o  one would be 
respons i b l e .  Perhaps this is the way the world "real ly" is. If so,  our 
pract ices of holding some people legal l y  respon s i b l e  and exempting 
others from responsibility are perhaps morally suspect, but determinism 
or uni versa! causation cannot be an excusing condition in a world with 
respon s i b i li ty . To believe that causation excuses is what I have termed 
the "fundamental psycholegal error."22 Of course, excusing conditions 
such as irrationality or coercion are themsel ve s  cau sed by s omething, but 
they are not excuses because they are caused. 
S o-called partial or selective causation is an oxymoron that fails to 
correct the f undamental psyc holegal e tTor. Causation is not a matter of 
degree. If behavi or is caused at all-as i t  surely is-it is fully the 
product of its jointly sufficient causes.  We know m ore about the causes 
of some behavioral phenomena than about others, but pattial information 
is different from partial causation. Causation per se is not an excuse and 
behavior is not excused to the extent it is caused. Respon sibility is not 
inversely proportional to the strength of causation. Children are not 
excused because their behavior is more caused than the behavior of 
adults. They are n ot fully responsible because they are n ot fully rational. 
Even an abnormal cause does not excuse or create n onresponsibility 
per se, including psychopathology or pathology of the brain and nervous 
system. When agents behave inexplicably irrationally, we frequently 
believe that underlying pathology produces the irrationality, but it is the 
irrationality, not the pathology, that produces n onresponsibility . After 
all, pathology does not always produce an excusing condition, and when 
it does not, there is n o  reason to excuse the resultant conduct. To see 
why, imagine a case in which pathology is a but-for cause of rational 
behavior. Consider a person with paranoid fears for her personal safety, 
who is therefore hypervigilant to cues of impending danger. Suppose on 
a given occasion she accurately perceives such a cue and kills properly 
2 1 .  See Stephen J. Morse, Deprivmion and Desert, in FROM CRIMINAL J USTICE TO 
SOCIAL JUSTICE, (Will iam Heffernan & John Kleinig eds . ,  forthcoming 2000) .  
22 .  Stephen J .  Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and 
Conceptual Revie11' , 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 329, 350 ( 1 998) .  
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to save her l i fe .  If she had not been patholog ically hypervigi lant, she 
would have missed the cue and been ki l led .  She is perfectly responsible 
for this rational , justifiable homicide. Or take the case of a hypomanic 
businessperson, whose manic energy and heightened powers are a but­
for cause of making an extremely shrewd deal . Assume that business 
conditions later change unforeseeably and the deal is now a loser. The 
deal was surely rational and uncompelled when it was made and no 
sensible l egal system would later void it because the businessperson was 
incompetent to contract. Even when pathology is uncontroversially a 
but-for cause of behavior, that conduct wil l  be excused only if an 
independent excusing condition , such as sufficient inationality or hard 
choice , is present. Even a highly abnormal cause will not excuse unless 
it produces a genuine excusing condition . 
ln this age of exciting and rapid advances in  brain science, the 
discovery of biological pathology that may be associated with legal ly  
relevant behavior lures many people to  treat the agent as  purely a 
mechanism and the behavior as s imply the movements of a biological 
organi sm. Because mechan isms and their movements are not 
appropriate objects of moral and legal responsibility ,  the inevitable 
conclusion seems to be that the agent should not be held legally 
responsible. Nevertheless, causation is neither an excuse nor does i t  
create nonresponsibility, and even within a more sophisticated theory of  
nonresponsibili ty or  excuse, brain or nervous system pathology will  
usually play a l imited role in  supporting an individual excusing 
condition. 
To begin, biological causation will only be part of the causal 
determinants of any intentional conduct, which is  always mediated by 
one ' s  culture, language, and the l ike. The best accounts of the rel ation 
between brain and behavior suggest that, no discrete bit of physiology 
always and everywhere produces exactly the same intentional conduct in  
a l l  human beings experiencing that physiological state, no stimulus 
produces exactly the same brain states in  all people responding to it ,  and 
no bit of exactly the same behavior emitted by different people is 
attended by exactly the same brain state in all the similarly-behaving 
agents. For example, the same pathophysiological or psychopatho­
logical processes may produce delusional beliefs in all people in whom 
these processes operate, but the delusional content and resultant behavior 
of delusional thirteenth-century subcontinental Indians will surely differ 
from that of delusional late twentieth-century Americans .  B iological 
variables are not the sole determinants of intentional human action. 
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More fundamentally, biological causation will not excuse per se 
because peopl e  are biological creatures and biology is always part of the 
causal chain for everything we do. If biological causation excused, no 
one would be responsible. Intentional human action and 
neuropathologically-produced human movements are both biologically 
driven, yet they are conceptu al l y ,  moral ly ,  and legally distinguishable.  
Moreover, if biology were "all" the explanation and everything else, 
including causal reasons for action, were simply epiphenomenal, as the 
eliminative materialists claim, then our entire notions of ourselves and 
responsibility would surely alter radically. B u t  eliminative materialism 
is philosophically controversiaf23 and science furnishes no reason to 
believe that it is true. I ndeed, it is not clear conceptually that science 
could demonstrate that it is true. Thus, until the doctor comes and 
convinces us that our normative belief in human agency and 
responsibility is itself pathological, biological causation per se does not 
excuse. 
Abnormal biological causation also does not excuse per se. Human 
action can be rational or irrational , uncoerced or coerced, whether its 
causes are "normal" or "abnormal . "  Whatever the causes of human 
action may be, they will ultimately be expressed through reasons for 
action, which are the true objects of responsibility analysis. S uppose, 
for example, that a confirmed brain lesion, such as a tumor, is a but-for 
cause of behavior. That is, let us suppose that a particular piece of 
undesirable behavior would not have occurred if the agent never had the 
tumor. Make the further, strong assumption that once the tumor is 
removed, the probability that this agent will behave i n  the legally 
relevant manner drops to zero. Although one' s  strong intuition may be 
that this agent is not responsible for the undesirable behavior, the given 
assumptions do not entail the conclusion that the agent should be 
excused. The undesirable behavior is human action, not a l iterally 
in·esistible mechanism, and the causal role of the brain tumor does not 
necessarily mean that the behavior was irrational or coerced. As Herbert 
F ingarette and Anne Hasse demonstrated in 1 979,24 that conclusion 
requires independent analysis of irrationality and coercion, rather than 
the question-begging answer that diseases excuse. 
Moreover, it is a mistake to assume that specific brain pathology 
inevitably produces highly specific, complex, intentional action. Certain 
23. See Galen Strawson, Consciousness, Free Will, and The Unimportance of 
Determinism, 32 INQUIRY 3, 3 ( 1989) (claiming that reductive physicalism about the 
mind is "moonshine"); see generally JOHN R. SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 
( 1 992) (providing an extended argument for the irreducible reality of mind). 
24. See FINGARETTE & HASSE, supra note 1 6, at 55-65. 
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areas of the brain do control general functions . For example, Broca 's  
area i n  the left frontal lobe controls the abi l ity to  comprehend and 
produce appropriate language. A suffic ient lesion in this  site produces 
and enables us to predict aphasia .  But there is no region or site in the 
frontal lobes or anywhere else in the brain that controls specific,  
complex, i ntentional actions .  No lesion enables us to explain causally or 
to predict an agent ' s  reasons and consequent i ntentional action in the 
same direct, precise way that a lesion in B roca' s area permits the 
explanation or prediction of aphas ia .  Neurological lesions can dissociate 
bodily movements from apparent intentions, producing automatisms and 
similar "unconscious" states.25 But  such states rarely  produce l egal ly 
relevant behavior, and when they do,  the agent is not considered 
responsible .  In these cases we need not even reach the issue of whether 
the agent' s i ntentional action is rational, because action itself is 
lackin'g. 26 The story rel ating brain or nervous system pathology to 
intentional conduct wil l  be far more complicated and far less direct than 
the already-complicated correspondence between brain lesions and the 
reduction or loss of general functions .  
The effect of brain or other nervous system pathology wil l  affect the 
agent more generally .  Suppose, for example, the tumor in the previous 
example makes the agent initable or emotionally l abile .  Such emotional 
states surely make it harder for any agent  to behave well in the face of 
variables such as provocation or stress, for example, but per se they do 
not render an agent inational. Other agents may be equally initabl e  or 
labile as the result of environmental variables, such as the loss of s leep 
and stress associated with, say, taking law exams or trying an important, 
difficult, lengthy case. But these people would not be excused if they 
offended while in an uncharacteristic emotional state , unless that state 
sufficiently deprived them of rationality. People  with congenital 
abnormalities or lifelong character traits that predispose them to 
undesirabl e  l egally relevant behavior would have even less excuse for 
undesirable behavior because they had the time and experience to learn 
to deal with those aspects of themselves that made behaving well harder. 
Consider the case of Charles Whitman, who killed many victims by 
shooting passers-by from the top of the tower on the University of Texas 
25.  I thank Norman R. Relkin, M.D. ,  Ph.D., for making this point to me 
particularly clearly. 
26. Bodily movements that are unconscious are not voluntary acts. See, e.g. , 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.0 1 (2) ( 1 985). 
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campus . He suffered from a brain tumor, and let us assume that we 
could  demonstrate incontrovertibly that he would  not h ave shot if he had 
not suffered from the tumor. B ut whether he is nonetheless responsible 
depends not on the but-for causation of h is  homicides, but  on h i s  reasons 
for action . If  Whitman believed, for example ,  that m ass  murder of 
innocents would produce eternal peace on earth, then he should be 
excused, whether the delusional bel ief was a product of brain pathology,  
ch i ldhood trauma, or whatever. But  if Whitman was simply an angry 
person who believed that life had dealt him a raw deal and that he was 
going to go out i n  a b laze of glory that would gi ve h i s  m iserable l i fe 
meaning, then he is unfortunate but responsible, whether h i s  anger and 
beliefs were a product of the tumor, childhood trauma, an un fortunate 
character, or whatever. 
A l l  human action i s ,  in part, the product of but-for causes over which 
agents have no control and which they are powerless to change, 
including thei r  genetic endowments and the nature and context of their 
childrearing.  If people had different genes, d ifferent parents, and 
d ifferent cultures, they would be different. Moreover, s i tuational 
determinants over which agents h ave no control are but-for causes of 
much behavior.  A victim in the wrong place at the wrong time is as 
much a but-for cause of the mugging as the mugger' s genetics and 
experiences. If no victim is available, no mugging occurs , whatever the 
would-be mugger' s intentions are. Such considerations are treated by 
philosophers under the rubric ,  "moral luck."27 Our characters , our 
opportunities, and the outcomes of our actions are in  large measure the 
product of luck, and if luck excused, no one would be responsible . A 
brain tumor or other neuropathology that enhances the probability of the 
sufferer engaging in irrationally-motivated ,  legally relevant behavior is 
surely an example of bad luck. But unless the agent is  in fact irrational 
or the behavior is coerced, there is no reason to excuse the agent simply 
because bad luck in the form of biological pathology played a causal 
role. A cause is only a cause. It is  not per se an excuse. 
The locutions "free will" or "free choice" are often used as criteria for 
responsibility and their l ack as criteria for excuse. But these are usually 
just conclusory labels that are placeholders for the genuine responsibility 
and excusing criteria. There is no uncontroversial philosophical 
definition of these terms.  When employed as the opposites of 
determinism or universal causation, they are subject to the same 
problems just explored: Everyone or no one will be responsible. 
Moreover, excused action is intentional, the product of choice, and there 
27. See generally MORAL LUCK (Daniel Statman ed., 1 993)  (collecting classic 
articles addressing the topic). 
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is nothing wrong with the excused agent ' s will ,  properly understood as 
an executory function that produces actions from desires, bel iefs and 
consequent i ntentions .  Consider, for example, the agent subject to 
duress  who acts wrongly to ave1t threatened harm. The compelled agent 
acts i ntentional ly,  chooses to act to avoid threatened harm, and quite 
effectively acts wrongly to achieve this goal . People can behave 
intentional ly and effectively but irrationally and choice can of course be 
unfairly constrained. If so,  it is the agent ' s  irrationality or difficulty of 
choice that excuses, not the lack of free wi l l  or the abili ty to choose . 
Finally,  it is sometimes said that lack of control over conduct is the 
reason we excuse, but thi s  locution obscures more than it c lar ifies .  
Determinism or universal causation is  not inconsistent with control over 
one ' s  conduct. If it were, everyone or no one would be responsible ,  
depending on whether determinism or u niversal causation were true .  
Thus ,  understood as the opposite of determinism, control cannot explain 
the excusing conditions we now have or any coherent system in  which 
some people are excused and most are not. The abil ity to have control ,  
i n  the operative sense, has nothing to do with determinism. Sometimes, 
of course, the agent genuinely has no control over the movements of her 
body, say because there is  neuropathology or force majeure, but these 
are cases of no act ion and l ack of responsibil i ty is  unproblematic . But as 
we have seen repeatedly, the legally relevant behavior that triggers 
potential application of a mental health law involves undoubted human 
action.  In  such cases, lack of control is  a metaphorical or commonsense 
notion. Of course, if an agent is  irrational or coerced, i t  wil l  be hard to 
do the right thing, but then irrationality or coercion is  doing the genuine 
excusing work. Lack of control is the result, not the cause, of the 
excusing condition . 
I I I .  CRAZINESS AND RESPONSIBILITY : A PLEA FOR SIMPLICITY 
This Section begins by explaining that mental disorder rarely negates 
action. Then it turns to a discussion of the relation of mental disorder to 
rationality and claims that this rel ation accounts for mental health law 
generally and for virtually all applications of mental health laws i n  
i ndividual cases . Next i t  considers the relation of mental abnormality to 
so-called internal coercion or control problems . As previewed i n  
Section I I .B . ,  the argument is  that such alleged problems, even if 
produced by mental disorder, explain very few cases . Irrationality is  the 
better criterion.  The Section concludes with a plea for simplicity in 
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th inking about specific mental health law criteria. 
A. Craziness and Action 
People with mental disorders are not automatons who act 
unintentionally. Their legally relevant behavior is not a reflex or 
unconscious .  As is true for everyone, when crazy people act, they have 
reasons for thei r actions, and their wills or volitions operate effectively 
to translate their intentions into actions. The del usional self-defender, 
for example, believes she is in deadly peril, desires to live, forms the 
intention to kil l  her feared assass in .  and translates that i ntention into 
k i ll ing conduct aimed at the putative assassin .  For another example, a 
businessperson suffering from mania who is incapable of understanding 
the nature of the deal because she wildly overestimates her assets or 
totally misunderstands or ignores the risks believes the deal is a good 
one, desires to make money, forms the intention to make the deal, and 
translates this intention into action by making the deal and signing the 
contract. The legally relevant behavior of crazy people is i ntentional 
action, and they should be considered nonresponsible only if they lack 
the general capacity for rationality in that context or face a hard choice 
at the time. 
In rare cases, mental disorder may produce altered states of 
consciousness that create legal unconsciousness or "automatism." These 
arise primarily in the context of criminal responsibility and in most 
instances the law treats these situations as cases of no action ,  although 
some jurisdictions treat automatism as an affirmative defense. Again ,  
however, these cases are rare and  do  not account for an appreciable 
share of mental health law applications ,  even withi n  the criminal law. 
B .  Mental Disorder and Irrationality 
Mental disorders affect responsibility essentially because they grve 
people crazy reasons for legally relevant conduct. In reach ing this 
conclusion, I place myself firmly in the camp of Joel Feinberg,28 Herbert 
Fingarette and Anne Fingarette Hasse,29 and Michael Moore,30 all of 
whom h ave made similar claims. Put another way, craziness can 
2 8 .  See JOEL FEINBERG, What is So Special About Menral Illness, in  DOING AND 
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBil.!TY 272, 272 ( 1 97 1  ) .  
29. See FINGARETTE & HASSE. supra note 1 6 . 
30. See MICHAEL S .  MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE 
RELATIONSHIP 243-45 ( 1 984). 
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interfere with the capaci ty to grasp and be guided by good reason in a 
particular context, especial ly if the agent is grossly out of touch with 
reality because the agent has obviously crazy perceptions 
(halluci nations) or beli efs (delusions) .  How much craz iness must 
interfere to negate responsibil ity is a normative moral , political and legal 
question, but such inte1ierence is why some crazy people are treated 
specia l ly .  At the very least, crazy reasons must motivate the legally  
relevant behavior to  some degree, but how much the craziness must 
interfere with the agent' s abil ity to grasp and be guided by good reason 
is precisely the normative question.  
Consider those cases in which mental health l aws seem to apply  most 
unproblematically, cases in  which the agent is grossly out of touch with 
real ity concerning the legally relevant conduct. Without question, the 
delusional self-defender is legally insane and the delusional 
businessperson is incompetent to contract .  For another example, 
suppose the delusional self-defender or businessperson has not yet acted 
but the threat of danger or improvidence looms. Because they 
nonresponsibly threaten legally relevant behavior, the law may intervene 
by involuntary civil commitment or by guardianship, respectively .  
Discussion so  far has implicitly suggested that there is  a bright l ine, 
binary relation between rationality and irrationality.  Although mental 
health laws are generally standards that do draw such an (admittedly 
blurry) "bright" l ine, in principle and in fact rationality is  distributed 
along a continuum in the population at large and among people who 
suffer from mental disorders. Depending on the type and severity of 
disorder and its signs and symptoms, various mental disorders may 
affect rationality to varying degrees .  If rationality is  the touchstone of 
legal responsibility, responsibility is also distributed along a continuum 
and legal accountability might be adjusted accordingly .  In principle, 
therefore, there are degrees of partial responsibility and mental health 
l aw has good reason to adopt doctrines of partial responsibility in 
appropriate contexts, such as criminal responsibility . 3 1  
C .  Mental Disorder and Coercion 
A classic error concerning the relation of mental abnormality to 
responsibility is to assume that irrationally-motivated actions are 
3 I .  See MORSE, supra note 22, at 397-402. 
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coerced, but simply because they are i rrational they are no more coerced 
than rat ionally-mot ivated actions.  Consider again the delusional self­
defender, who ki l l s  in response to the delusionally m i staken bel ief that 
she i s  about to be k il led.  Human action to save one' s l i fe i s  not a 
mechanistic, l i terally irresistible cause of behavior and sel f-defens ive 
action motivated by i rrational beliefs i s  no more compelled than self­
defensive behavior motivated by unreasonably mistaken or rational 
bel iefs .  The deluded agent ' s  action is perfectly intentional-the 
delus ional belief provides the precise reason to form the intention to ki l l .  
Moreover, the killing i s  also not compelled simply because the belief is  
pathologically-produced. A non-delusional but unreasonably mi staken 
self-defender, who feels the same desire to save her own l i fe ,  would 
have no excuse for kill ing. There is also nothing wrong with our 
defender' s "wil l ," properly understood as an intentional executory state 
that translates desires and beliefs into action . The defender' s w i ll 
operated quite effectively to effectuate her desire to l ive when she 
delusionally bel ieved that she needed to kil l  to survive. The real reason 
our delusional self-defender ought to be excused, of course, is  that she is 
non-culpably irrational . This is  the excusing condit ion that distinguishes 
her from the non-delusional but unreasonably mistaken sel f-defender. In 
most cases, then, irrationality will be sufficient to excuse a crazy agent .  
Some mental abnormal i ties, so-called "compulsions," may seem 
naturally to raise the analogy of mechanism and to suggest that action i s  
lacking or  that a coercion excuse should obtain. In  these cases , the 
analogy to mechanism is flawed, however, and the coercion theory of 
excuse is problematic. Compulsive states are marked by allegedly 
overwhelming desires or cravings. But whether the cravings are 
produced by faulty biology, faulty psychology, faulty environment, or 
some combination of the three, a desire is just a desire and satisfaction of 
i t  is  human action . Even if craving is  the symptom of a disease with 
biological roots, the cause of the desire i s  immaterial .  Consider, for 
example, a person who suffers from "substance dependence disorder," 
or, to use the more common term, "addiction ." Possessing and using the 
substance in question is intentional action.  The addict desires either the 
pleasure of intoxication, the avoidance of the pain of wi thdrawal and 
inner tension, or both. The addict believes that using the substance w il l  
satisfy the desire and consequently forms the intention t o  possess and to 
use the substance. Or consider a person suffering  from "pedophilia," 
recurrent, strong desires for sexual contact with children that produce 
distress or dysfunction. If the person yields and has sexual contact with 
a child, this, too, is  surely i ntentional action. 
An analogy i s  often used to attempt to demonstrate that people 
suffering from mentally abnormal , compulsive states are similar to 
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mechan isms. We arc asked to imag ine that a person i s  hanging by the 
fingernai ls  from a c l i ff over a very deep chasm . The hapless cl iHhangcr 
is strong enough to hold on for a whi le ,  but not strong enough to save 
her l ife by pul l ing hersel f  up. As t ime passes and gravity and muscle 
physiology do thei r  work, she i nevitably weakens and i t  becomes harder 
and harder to hang on .  Final ly it becomes impossible and the c l iffhanger 
fal l s  to her death . We are asked to think that the operat ion of 
compulsive desires or cravings is l ike the combined effect of gravity and 
muscle physiology. At first the hapless su fferer can res ist, but inev i tably  
she weakens and satisfies the des i re for drugs, sex, or whatever. 
B rief reflection demonstrates that the analogy is tlawed as a putat ive 
explanation of why compuls ive states are "j ust l ike" mechan isms. 
Unl ike action to satisfy a desi re, the fal l  i s  a genui ne mechanism. We 
know that holding on indefi ni te ly i s  physically  impossible and that the 
ul t imate fai lure of strength i s  not i ntentionaL More i mportant, imagine 
the fol lowing counterexample :  a v icious gunslinger follows around the 
addict and the pedophile and threatens to k i l l  them instantly if they touch 
drugs or a child. Assume that the addict and the pedophile want to live 
as much as the cliffhanger. Literally no pedophile or addict will yield to 
the des i re .  They simply need sufficiently good reason not to yield.32 
Conversely, no cliffhanger will fail to fall ,  despite having the best reason 
not to do so. Indeed, even if the same v icious gunslinger threatened to 
shoot the cliffhanger immediately if she started to fall ,  she will fall every 
time. 
Another analogy often used to demonstrate that craving should excuse 
is  to th ink of the i ntense cravings or desires of "compulsive" states as an 
"internal" gun to the head. The l i teral gun to the head wrongly places 
the victim in an unenviable hard choice situation: Do something dreadful 
or be killed. As we saw in Section ILB .  the analogy is this :  The 
compulsive sufferer' s fear of physical or psychological withdrawal 
symptoms and of other dysphoric states33 is  so great that i t  is l ike the 
"do-it-or-else" fear of death or grievous bodily i njury that is necessary 
for a duress defense .34 Yielding to the compulsive desire, the craving, is  
3 2 .  See JON ELSTER, STRONG FEELINGS: EMOTION, ADDICTION, AND HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 1 35 -40, 1 66-68 ( 1 999) (discussing "reward sensitivity;" human action is 
virtually never total ly  "reward-insensitive"). 
33. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS ' N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 609 (4th ed. 1 994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Essential features of 
"impulse-control disorders" include a bui ld up of tension and arousal .  
34. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2 .09( 1 )  ( 1 985). 
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l ike yielding to threat o f  death or grievous bodi ly harm 35 We can not 
expect a person of reasonable firmness not to yield in the face of such an 
i nternally-generated hard choice, much as we cannot expect such a 
person not to yield i n  the face o f  an external threat of  death or grievous 
bodily harm. 
The analogy is attractive, but theoretically and practically problematic .  
Notice, first, that the analogy suggests no problem wi th the defender' s 
wil l ,  which operates effectively to execute the in tention to block or 
remove the dysphoria. Further, i t  i s  entirely rational to wish to terminate 
ghastly dysphoria, even if there are competing reasons not to, such as 
criminal sanctions, moral degradation or whatever. O n  the other hand, i f  
the craving sufficiently i nterferes with the sufferer' s  abil i ty to  grasp and 
be guided by reason, then a classic irrational i ty problem arises and there 
is no need to resort to i nternal coercion as the ground for excuse. 
Indeed, as I shall suggest presently,  i rrati onal ity better explains those 
cases of apparent i nternal coercion that seem to compromise 
responsibility. 
Assume that the sufferer from internal coercion remains suffic iently 
rational to fai l  an i rrationali ty test for nonresponsibility. Is  i t  the case 
that people with compulsions act on their cravings because they fear 
dysphoria? Perhaps they merely really, really, really want to yield and 
i t ' s  unpleasant not to-who l ikes not getting what one really ,  really, 
really wants?-but they don ' t  substantially fear the dysphoria. I suggest 
that the phenomenology of the sufferer' s  response to craving, unlike the 
phenomenology of the victim of a threat of death, is often not, and 
perhaps never, clear. Moreover, what if the primary motive is the 
pleasure or sati sfaction of y ielding or if such pleasure is an important, 
additional motive? The possibility of pleasure seems more l ike an offer 
than a threat and offers expand rather than contract freedom.36 The 
strong desire for pleasure is not a hard choice excusing condition in l aw 
or morals .  
Assuming that fear of dysphoria i s  a sufficient motive and that the 
analogy to the fear of death or grievous bodily harm is i nitially p lausible, 
we have already seen in Section II .B . that the claim for an internal 
coercion excuse is  nonetheless problematic, whatever m ight be its cause. 
Once again, if  people are so fearful that they appear incapable of 
resisting when reasonable people would, we would tend to believe that 
they are morbidly fearful .  In such cases, irrationali ty would l ikely be the 
35. See DSM-IV, supra note 33, at 609. Essential feature of "impulse-control 
c!isordei"s" i s  an experience of pleasure, satisfaction or relief after committing the 
impulsive act. 
36. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 204-11 ( 1 987) .  
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appropriate excusing claim;  there would be no need to resort to 
problematic i nternal coercion . 
Irrational ity i s  a better theory for excusing some sufferers from 
i n ternal ly coercive states. First, some compuls ions. such as addictions,  
can sometimes produce general changes in one ' s  l i festyle and 
fu nctioning that might reduce one ' s general capac ity to grasp and be 
guided by reason . Second, the effect might be more specific. The 
craving might be so "insistent" that it temporari l y  disables one ' s  rational 
capactttes concerni ng consummation . Tf so. an excuse for 
consummatory behavior might be warranted. In  either case, notice that 
the disease concept does no independent work. It perhaps explai n s  why 
the compu l sive craver became irrational , but irrational ity is the excusing 
condition . A thi rd approach is to claim that compuls ive desires are 
irrati onaL but this move is highly controversial .  As we have seen,  no 
convincing theory of the rationality of desires exists and simply terming 
the desire the symptom of a disease does not suggest that desires are 
i tTational . How desires are produced is independent of whether they are 
rational . 
D.  A Plea for Simplicity 
Mental health law addresses persons ,  intentional agents , not 
mechanisms. I have claimed that lack of the general capacity for 
rationality explains generally why some crazy people are treated 
specially and that such lack of rationality in a specific context, such as 
legal insanity ,  competence to contract, involuntary civil commitment, 
and the like, explains specific mental health l aw criteria. In  turn, lack of 
rationality means that the agent has crazy reasons for legally relevant 
behavior, such as criminal conduct, contracting conduct, or potentially 
dangerous conduct. Current mental health laws often define the criteria 
functionally .  For example, a legally insane agent does not know the 
nature of her conduct; an agent i ncompetent to contract does not 
understand the nature of the deal. But again ,  even if these functional 
criteria are met, the mental health law will apply only if an agent was 
incapable of being rational in  the circumstances.  Thu s ,  crazy reasons are 
crucial. I n  contexts governed b y  varying doctrinal approaches i n  
different jurisdictions, such a s  competence t o  make treatment decisions, 
the doctrinal differences have to do with how craziness i nterferes with 
decision making. For example, does craziness affect understanding, 
appreciation, or rational manipulation? Deciding which criterion should 
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be employed is a normative question.  but u l t i mate l y ,  w hichever test is 
chosen s imply tells  us  which ki nd of crazy reason w i l l  clo .  A nd in every 
case, the legal  dec i s ion maker m u st decide whether the e v i dence of crazy 
reasons supports the conc lusion that the agent was general l y  i ncapable of 
rati onality i n  the context .  
My adm ittedly u n real i stic and heuristic p lea i s  thi s :  A l l  mental health 
l aws shoul d  have the same form, asking not whether mental  d isorder 
produ ces or results i n  the legally re levant behavior, but aski n g  instead 
simply whether the age nt ' s  reason for the legall y  rel e vant behavior i s  
crazy and evidence o f  a general i ncapacity for rationa l i ty i n  that context. 
Th is i s  the core question ; the rest is di straction. I contend that l ess 
con fusion and more focu sed, rational mental health l a w  decis ion m aking 
woul d  result i f  thi s were the sole c riterion for app l ication of al l  laws that 
treat some crazy people specially because they are not s uffi c iently 
respons ible. 
The proposed criterio n  i s  no less precise than asking whether mental 
di sorder produces the legally relevant behavior and asks the question far 
more directly.  Asking whether a specific mental disorder, say, 
sch izophrenia, causes the legally relevant behavior is  in fact less precise.  
As DSM-IV recognizes,37 al l  people who suffer from the same disorder 
are not alike and, consequently , a diagnosis, no matter how clear or 
severe, provides no clue to the specific reasons for action that may have 
operated. More i mportant, i f  a specific disorder does support the 
application of a mental health law, it will be because the disorder 
produced a crazy reason that motivated the legall y  relevant behavior. 
Causation by mental disorder must be understood to mean being 
motivated by crazy reasons, not mechanically caused. Thus, i t  would be 
more efficient and less confu s i ng to focus on the reason itself, rather 
than on the presence of disorder and causal talk that m isleadingly 
suggest mechanism. As the next Section discusses, such a shift would 
produce salutary changes in cl inical assessment of potential subj ects of 
mental health law and in testimony concerning the application of mental 
health l aw in i ndividual cases . 
I V .  ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Thi s  Section discusses the data legal decision m akers need to 
adj udicate mental health law cases and the role of e xperts i n  assisting 
such adj udication. 
37.  See DSM-IV, supra note 33 ,  at xxii. 
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A. Derermining tf Reasons Are Crazy 
Section [ argued that the l aw v iews the person as a pract ical reaso n i ng. 
i ntentional agent. In other words ,  the l aw accepts the fol k  psychological  
expl anat ion of human act ion,  which explains action in terms o f  desires ,  
be l iefs ,  and i ntent ions.  With i n  this  account, the crucial question i s  
always. "Why d i d  you d o  that?" Mental health l aw i s  n o  exception to 
th is  general legal view.  When we can ' t  make sense of an agent ' s  l egal l y  
relevant behavior,  w e  must al ways ask, "Why i s  the agent behaving this 
way ?" and we must always understand that the answer w i l l  be a reason,  
rather than a mechanistic cause . So, if  a criminal defendant appears 
unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or to ass is t  cou nse l ,  
w e  need t o  ask w h y  she seems t o  be having these difficult ies .  I f  w e  want 
to know whether we shoul d  accept a patient 's  refusal to accept or to 
adhere to a seemi ngly justified medical prescription, we must ask why 
she docs so. If we want to know whether a crimin al defendant was 
l egal ly  i nsane, we must ask why she committed the crime . And in all 
cases, to repeat, even if the reason given i s  crazy or doesn ' t  make 
rational sense, we must still ask whether the agent was capable of being 
rational . After all ,  the incapacity to be rational is  why some crazy 
people are treated specially. 
To determine if a person acted both crazily and lacked the general 
capacity for rationality , the factfinder needs a detailed, descriptive 
account of the agent' s reasons for action in the context in question. 
These data may be obtained from family, friends, co-workers, observers, 
and mental health professionals. Mental health professionals may be 
trained, efficient observers-if they are good clinicians-but in general, 
all people are quite expert at gleaning other agents ' reasons for action.  
Without this expertise, successful  human i nteraction woul d  be 
i mpossible.  
W ith the ful lest possible understanding of the agent' s reason s  for 
action in hand, it will typicall y  be possible to decide according to the 
operative norm of rationality if the person acted crazily, but  the question 
of the general capacity for rational ity in  the circumstances remain s  open . 
How do we know that an agent who has acted crazily i s  incapable of 
acting rationally? The standard answer is that the crazy action is the 
symptom of a disease and symptoms are not "voluntary ." There is some 
truth to this response, but it is ultimately question-begging. People  with 
and without mental disorder are generally not responsible for thoughts, 
feelings, and perceptions because we do not intentionally produce them .  
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Yes ,  they are our thoughts, feelings. and perception s-in the argot of 
therapy, we must "own" them-but they are virtually never the product 
of practical reason:  they are si mply givens of our experience . Of cour se, 
mental health l aw never i ntervenes in an agent ' s  l ife u nless those 
thoughts,  feel i ngs,  and perceptions motivate legally relevant conduct or 
potential conduct . 
Conceding that an agent may not be responsible for motivating 
variables does not entail that the agent is not responsible for the conduct 
that they motivate. We are all subject on occasion to i rrational thoughts , 
untoward feelings,  and highly in accurate perceptions ,  but we believe that 
most people are capable of testing those thoughts, feel i ngs , and actions 
against reality before acting on them. In  a word, most people are 
capable of getting it right, even if their psychological state predisposes 
them to irrational action. In contrast, we bel ieve that mental disorder 
makes it more difficult to test reality .  But whether the disorder m akes it 
too difficult to hold the agent responsible for conduct requires a factual 
analysis of whether a particular agent was capable of refraining from 
crazy conduct when crazy motivating variables existed. It begs the 
question to assume that the agent  is  not responsible for the conduct that 
follows just because the motivating variables are symptom s .  
Consider the example o f  drug addiction, which m any clai m  is  
indisputably a "brain disease ."38 Even i f  i t  i s ,  one must distinguish 
between the brain changes and psychological craving feel ings that 
persistent use produces, on the one hand, and drug seeking and using 
behavior, on the other. Assuming that an addict i s  not responsible for 
"addiction" and is therefore not responsible for brai n  changes and 
craving, neither of which i s  human action, it is stil l  an open question 
whether the addict is responsible for drug-related behavior .  And this 
question must be answered in terms of the capacity for rational i ty or 
internal coercion.39 An agent m ay be responsibl e  for symptomatic 
conduct because suffi c ient capacity for rationality is m ai ntained or 
because the fear of withdrawal or similar dysphoric feel ings does not 
produce a sufficiently h ard choice . 
There i s  no valid scientific or c linical test for whether an agent 
possesses sufficient capacity for rationality to be responsible .  Deciding 
whether such capacity is lost is  therefore a common sense i nference 
38. Thomas R .  Kosten, Editorial, Addiction as a Brain Disease, 1 55 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 7 1 1 ( 1 998);  Alan I. Leshner, Science is Revolutionizing Our View of 
Addiction-and What to Do About It, 1 56 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY I ,  1 ( 1 999) ; Alan I. 
Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, SCI., Oct. 3, 1 997, at 45.  
39. See FINGARETTE & HASSE, supra note 1 6, at 1 37-54, 1 9 1 -95 ;  Stephen J .  Morse, 
Hooked on Hype, LAW & PHIL. (forthcoming 2000). 
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from data about the agent' s conduct at the t i me and in the past. in both 
s imi lar and d i fferent circumstances .  I n  principle,  drawing th is  i nference 
i s  no different from drawing any other i n ference about general 
behavi oral capacities, such as the capac i ty to  produce i nnovative legal 
scholarship or the capacity to play professi onal golf success fu l l y .  The 
ful lest pos s i ble behavioral data are necessary to draw the inference, 
often including a rich behavioral history . Again ,  m any people can 
provide such prim ary data about the agent .  M ental health professionals 
or other knowledgeable experts can provide general c l in ical or scientific 
knowledge, i f  such valid knowledge i s  avail able, about the 
ch aracteri stics of people similar to the agent. Ulti mately, however, the 
final j udgment must be about the specific indi vidual who i s  the potential 
subject of special mental health law treatment. 
In some cases, on policy grounds the law might not permit an agent to 
m ake a deci s ion for crazy reasons ,  even i f  the agent seemed to retain the 
general capacity for rationality , because too much is at stake. Decisions 
concerning capital punishment might be an apt example. Suppose, an 
agent refused to present mitigating evidence for primarily crazy reasons .  
Even if the reasons did not indicate lack of a general capacity for 
rationality , the l aw might not permit the waiver because it simply will 
not let an agent "choose" death for irrational reasons. In most cases, 
however, sufficiently crazy reasons will indicate the lack of a general 
capacity for rationality-indeed, such reasons are the best evidence. 
Should psychi atric or p sychological diagnosis play a role i n  legal 
proceedings? I argued previousl 0 and still believe that i t  should not. 
All  DSM-IV diagnostic categories i nclude necessary behavioral crite1ia, 
and for most, including schizophrenia and affective disorders, behavioral 
criteria alone are sufficient to j ustify the diagnosis .  The question i s  
whether a diagnosi s  produces value added beyond the information 
conveyed by the behavioral criteria that define the diagnostic category. 
The legal issue in mental health l aw cases i s  never whether the agent 
suffers from a disease ;  rather, it is always whether the agent has a crazy 
reason for legally relevant conduct. It is difficult to i magine, therefore, 
what additional information the diagnostic term conveys, especially 
because an agent m ay well be responsible for legally relevant conduct 
40. See M orse, supra note 1 at 604- 1 5 ;  Stephen J .  Morse, Failed Explanations and 
Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L REV. 97 1 ,  1 059-70 
( 1 982).  But see Richard J.  Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Menral Healrlz 
Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Specularion, 66 VA. L 
REV. 427 ( 1 980). 
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moti vated by allegedly "sy mpromatic" crazy thoughts , feel ings,  and 
act ions .  Moreover, as D S M - I V  recognizes:� 1 all people whose behavior 
meet the criteria for the same d iagnos i s  are not alike. Finally,  re levant 
general i n formation can eas i ly  be provided without us ing diagnostic 
term i nology . For example, without using a d iagnostic term and 
speaking only i n  terms of  behavior, an expert coul d  provide research 
evidence that indicates that people who have crazy thoughts s i m il ar to 
those of  the agent u nder cons ideration also tend to behave in other, 
specified ways .  It can be extremely d iffi c u l t  in some c ases to determi n e  
\Vhat the agent ' s  reasons were, b u t  a diagnosis w i l l  not c lari fy the 
obscure .  
Although diagnoses furnish l ittle i ndependent i nformation t o  the 
finder of fact, experts always use such terms in their work and why 
should we bar them from doing so i n  courts or adm i nistrat ive 
proceedings i f  they do no harm? I contend, however, that diagnoses do 
have the potential for substantial harm i n  mental health law adj udicati o n  
because they tend t o  encourage the mistaken impression that the conduct 
of  crazy people i s  j ust  a mechanism, rather than action for reasons.  
Diagnoses tend to encourage question-begging about the fou ndational, 
nonresponsibility criterion that authorizes special mental health law 
treatment. Diagnoses are therefore prej udicial and m isleading.  In 
addition, there is  often dispute about the appropriate diagnosis,  i f  any, 
which wastes time and distracts the factfi nder from the essential question 
of crazy reasons . For example, the Hinckley jury s hould not have 
considered whether H inckley was suffering from schizoid or schizotypal 
personali ty disorder or schizophrenia; rather, i t  should h ave considered 
only w hether he was out of touch with real ity , and if so, to what extent. 
The answer to the former question can not produce an answer to the 
latter. To decide if Hinckley acted for crazy reasons required only 
analysis of his contemporaneous reasons for attempting to assassinate 
President Reagan, i ncluding l ife historical data relevant to determining 
what those reasons were. 
Some argue that diagnosis should play an independent role in mental 
health law adj udication because it  p laces obj ective constraints on the 
inationality determination.42 Without some constraint, the determination 
allegedly will be subj ec t  to arbitrary, relativistic criteria .  The presence 
of diagnosable mental d isorder i s  thus some wanant for the conclusion 
that there was genuine, objective impairment of the agent' s  general 
4 1 .  DSM-IV, supra note 33,  at xxi i .  
42.  See United States v .  Moore, 486 F.2d 1 1 39, 1 1 80 (D.C.  Cir .  1 973)  (Leventhal ,  
J . ,  concurring). Richard Bonnie has also made this point in a personal communication to 
the author (February 20, 1 999) .  
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c apacity for rat ional i ty . Thi s  argument has force , but the presence of a 
mental disorder has l ess constraining value than proponents bel ieve . For 
the most part, only those agents grossly out of touch with real ity wi l l  
satisfy the nonresponsibil ity criterion and such a mental state i s  
obj ectively i rrational even without a diagnostic label . Cases of lesser 
irrational i ty will  not qual ify for speci al mental health l aw treatment, 
even if the behavior does wan-ant an offic ial diagnosis.  F inal ly ,  mental 
d i sorder di agnoses are based on subj ective, social ly-constructed criter ia  
that may be manipul ated for soc ial ,  legal, and political purposes.  I n  a 
word, psychiatric and psychological diagnoses are instinct with 
normativity . If  our society for any reason wishes either to expand or to 
contract the class of people with alleged mental disorders for whom 
special legal treatment is  appropriate, diagnostic categories will not 
inhibit such action . I agree with critics that the criteria for rationa lity 
that I have offered do not provide a precise, obj ective guide to the Jack 
of a general capacity for rationality,  but this i s  a problem inherent i n  the 
notion of rational practical reasoning. No such guide, including 
d i agnosis, can substitute for careful evaluation of reasons for action.  
Is  a causal account of why the agent may have had crazy reasons 
relevant to determining the presence of such reasons? For the most part, 
I think not. A valid causal story will indicate that the agent is  not 
malingering craziness ,  but malingering i s  better assessed b y  careful 
behavioral evaluation, i ncluding the use of third p arty i nformation.43 
More important, causal explanations in psychiatry and psychology , 
independent of folk psychological explanation, are seldom valid, and 
inval id stories, no matter how persuasive they seem, cannot aid the 
finder of fact .  If there i s  no question of m alingering-and malingerin g  
is n o t  a n  issue i n  m o s t  mental health law decision making-then causal 
accounts will  not be helpful to determine whether the agent acted for 
crazy reasons and was generally capable of rationality. The question i s  
always whether sufficiently crazy reasons exist, not whether we can 
explai n  why they exist. Thick description of behavior itself will be far 
more relevant and useful for determining the former. Moreover, causal 
explanations are like diagnoses: They ten d  to create the impression that 
43. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL. , PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: 
A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 53-58 (2d ed. 1 997) 
(expressing caution, however, about the abi l i ty to detect psychological or psychi atric 
malingering by any means) ;  see generally CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND 
DECEPTION (Richard Rogers ed., 2d ed. ,  1 997) (addressing clinical and research issues 
and data) . 
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the agent is not responsible for the behavior caused. Again ,  a story 
about neurotransmitters , psychodynamics, soci al stress ,  or whatever may 
explai n why an agent had crazy thoughts, feelings, or perceptions. But i t  
wi l i  not explain whether those thoughts, feelings and perceptions  
moti vated legally relevant conduct, and i f  so ,  whether the agent i s  
responsible for it .  
Let us consider a real ist ic example . Some ki l lers convicted of capital 
murder waive their constitu ti onal right to present mitigating evidence at 
the capi tal sentencing stage of the proceedings .  In effect, they consent to 
their own execution.  Provided that their waiver i s  voluntary, that i s ,  
rational and uncoerced ,  the law permits them to waive based on respect 
for their personhood and autonomy. Now, why would they waive the 
right to present undoubtedl y  relevant, potential ly  effective, mitigating 
evidence? Why would they consent to what is in  effect state-assisted 
suici de? One possibi l ity is that they feel  genuinely morally gui lty and 
believe that they deserve to die for their crimes .  Assuming, as the vast 
majority of states do, that some capital ki l lers do deserve to die, such a 
reason would be perfectly rational .  But, to take an easy case, suppose 
the ki ller genuinely, delusionally believes that her own death will bring 
the victim back to life .  This would clearly be a crazy reason, without 
regard to why the killer was delusional . 
Now consider a more difficult example. Suppose after substantial 
evaluation of a kil ler who killed his own loved ones, a c linician 
concludes that the killer suffers from an underlying depression that has 
produced irrational guilt . It is a commonplace belief that losses can 
predispose to depression and that depression can produce irrational guilt . 
The question is whether this kil ler actual ly suffers from irrational guil t, a 
question not answered by the diagnosis of depression. Indeed, evidence 
of irrational guilt will indicate that depression is  present, rather than the 
reverse .  And such evidence would have to be behavioral , based on the 
ki ller' s thoughts, feelings, and perceptions about why she wants to die 
and why the potential mitigating evidence does not demonstrate that 
perhaps she deserves to live. Even if such thoughts, feelings, and 
perceptions may have been the product of depression, it does not follow 
that the decision to waive the right to present mitigating evidence was 
based on a sufficiently crazy reason to inval idate the waiver. This 
decision is normative. In sum, causal explanations wi l l  add little to thick 
behavioral description and common sense inferences from such 
descriptive data about the general capacity for rationality . 
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B .  Determining if lntemal Coercion Obtoins 
argued i n  Section II that inationatity explai ns most cases of 
nonresponsibil ity or excuse that are ordi nari ly thought to raise control or 
vol itional problems. For the purpose of argument, however, it is useful 
to assume that there may be a smal l ,  res idual c lass of rational agents, 
uncoerced by external forces, who should be excused. Assuming, then, 
that i nternal coercion is an excusing condition, how do we assess the 
strength of the fear or other dysphoric psychological states that might 
create a sufficiently hard choice? 
Consider the formulation,  "unable to res ist," which has the 
unmistakable implication of mechanism. Unless force majeure or 
genu ine mechanism i s  at work, we virtual ly  never know whether the 
agent is in some sense genuinely unable or is simply unwilling to resist, 
and if the l atter, how hard i t  is for the agent to resist .  B ased on ordinary 
experience and common sense, the criminal law, for example, uses . 
threats of death or grievous bodily harms as objective indicators of the 
type of stimulus that would in ordinary people create sufficient hard 
choice to wanant an excuse. Of course, people subjected to such threats 
wil l  differ markedly in their subjective responses and in their desires to 
l i ve or to remain uninjured, but ordinary, average people wil l  have very 
substantial desire to avoid the threatened harm.44 It is true that we have 
all experienced dysphoric states, and many have experienced intense 
dysphoria, but dysphoria as a source of present and potenti al pain i s  
more purely subjective than death or  grievous bodily injury. 
Consequently ,  assessing the average or ordinary intensity of inner states, 
including seemingly strong states ,  is s imply more difficult. 
Research evidence exists concerning the characteristics that help 
people maintain control when faced with temptation or experiencing 
impulses .45 But such research i s  no more than a general guide in  the 
44. Again, the analysis could apply to moral dilemmas that the criminal law does 
not address. Imagine a person who possesses a monetarily worthless locket that contains 
an equally financially worthless but emotionally priceless memento, say, a strand of a 
sainted parent's hair. One could easily imagine that a threat to destroy the locket might 
morally excuse quite serious property crime and perhaps crimes against the person, 
although the criminal law would recognize no excuse in this case. 
45. See RoY F. BAUMEISTER ET AL., LOSING CONTROL: HOW AND WHY PEOPLE 
FAIL AT SELF-REGULATION 242-56 ( 1 994) (considering self-regulation techniques and 
distinguishing underregulation, in which the agent often actively participates, and 
misregulation, in which the agent seldom actively participates). 
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present state of knowledge. There is no metric and no instrumentation 
accurately to resolve questions about the strength of dysphoria or desire 
and the abil i ty to resist. Indeed, the difficu l ty of distinguishing between 
an al legedly " irresistible" desire and one s imply not resisted was a 
primary reason that both the American Psychiatric Association and the 
American Bar Association recommended the abolition of the control or 
vol itional test for legal insanity in the wake of the ferment fol lowing the 
Hinckley verdict.46 This well-placed concern general izes to all mental 
health laws that treat crazy people special ly because, al legedly ,  their 
disorders "compel" l egally relevant behavior. If empirical ,  subjective 
"resistibility" is to be the touchstone, legal decisionmakers will simply 
have to act with l i ttle scientific guidance and lots of common sense.47 
Assessing the capacity for rationality is  not an easy task, but it is  a more 
commonsense assessment of the sort we make every day. More 
objective markers of internal coercion, such as physical withdrawal 
symptoms in the case of addictive cravings, wi l l  surely help,  but they 
wi l l  not be dispositive .  
C .  Crazy Reasons, Internal Coercion and Prediction 
Some mental health laws require a prediction that crazy reason s  or 
internal coercion will  produce future, legally relevant behavior. Unless 
the motivation for future conduct is  crazy, however, theoretical and legal 
warrant for preventive action is lacking because the nonresponsibility 
assumption does not apply.  Risk factors unrelated to craziness, such as 
age, sex, and past history of similar legally relevant behavior, may 
46. Virtually all jurisdictions that enacted insanity defense changes during the 
reform ferment that occurred after John W. Hinckley, Jr. was found not guilty by reason 
of insanity for attempting to assassinate President Reagan abolished the control test. For 
example, by 1 982 (pre-Hinckley verdict) the Model Penal Code rule had been adopted 
by all but one federal circuit, but in 1 984 Congress adopted a narrower, purely cognitive 
rule, not unlike M'Naghten. After the Hinckley verdict, both the A merican B ar 
Association and the American Psychiatric Association recommended abolition of the 
control test of legal insanity. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 330, 339-42 ( 1 984); American Psychiatric Ass ' n  Insanity 
Defense Work Group, Statement on the Insanity Defense, reprinted in 1 40 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 68 1 -88 ( 1983). 
47. For example, one writer explains that "[t]he strength of the craving may be 
gauged by how willing the person is to sacrifice other sources of reward or well-being in 
life to continue engaging in the addictive behavior." DENNIS M. DONOVAN, Assessmem 
of Addictive Behaviors: Implications of an Emerging Biopsychosocial Model, in 
ASSESSMENT OF ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 3, 6 (Dennis M .  Donovan & G. Alan M arlatt 
eds . ,  1 988) .  Although written by an estimable researcher, it is no more than an 
operationalized, common sense measure. 
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increase the pred ictabi l i ty of the legal l y  relevant behavior, such as future 
v iolent conduct, but unless we can also predict that moti vating craziness 
wi l l  pers i s t .  special mental health law treatment will not be justified. 
A fter al l ,  predictabi l i ty i s  not inconsistent with responsibil ity .  
The predictive questions ,  therefore, are whether suffic iently crazy 
reasons will persist and whether the agent wil l  act on them . Crazy and 
non-crazy people alike often have potentially motivating thoughts , 
feel ings and perceptions that do not persist , and even if they do persist, 
people do not always respond with action .  The proper approach to 
determining the relevance of crazy reasons to future legally relevant 
conduct is straightforward, but the data required for accurate prediction 
may be problemat ic .  This decision once again requires a traditional, 
thick assessment of reasons for action, l argely based on common-sense 
inferences from present and past behavior. Diagnoses will not 
independently answer the predictive questions about craziness or legal ly 
relevant conduct, although the behavioral data upon which they are 
based may be of help . I ndeed, behavioral and demographic variables, 
especiall y  past h istory, are far more likely to be valid predictors than 
purely clinical and psychopathological variables or diagnoses.48 Valid 
causal explanations might in theory generate valid predictions 
concerning whether craziness will persist and whether legally relevant 
behavior will occur, but few if any such explanations are available at 
present. 
In conclusion, crazy reasons are crucial to the predictive enterprise in  
mental health law because they are the guide to the foundational 
nonresponsibility assumption that justifies special legal treatment. 
Getting the prediction right is  a technical problem. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Crazy reasons are the royal road to understanding why mental health 
law exists and how individual cases should be adjudicated. Once one 
understands the law' s view of the person and why the lack of the general 
capacity for rationality is  the fundamental excusing condition,  it follows 
that crazy reasons are the best evidence of this condition. Much of the 
scientific and clinical reasoning and technical apparatus brought to bear 
48. See James Bonta et al . ,  The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism 
Among Mentall_v Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 1 23 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 23 ,  1 39 
( 1 998) .  
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on explain i ng and adjudicating mental health law i s  i rrelevant  and 
there fore u nnecessary and distract ing .  It also tends to obscure the 
crucial  question of responsibil ity.  Justify ing  and adj udic at ing m ental 
health l aw are normative and common sense tasks rather than sc ient ific  
or c l in ical  enterpri ses.  
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